| July 3rd 1863 GETTYSBURG BATTLE SUPPLEMENT III |
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| From the editor: Many of the seeds for the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg were sown in General Lee's first campaign as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia. Facing George McClellan's mighty army just a few miles from Richmond, Lee sent Jeb Stuart out to find McClellan's right flank. Unsatisfied with merely performing this reconnaissance mission, Stuart rode around McClellan's entire army before bringing Lee the desired information. For Stuart, the ride brought glory and fame, and his risky maneuver brought no rebuke from Robert E. Lee. Early in the Gettysburg campaign, Stuart, again goes on a wild ride and his absence casts a long shadow on the Confederate chances of victory at Gettysburg. Lee's army collides blindly with the Army of the Potomac, and throughout the three day battle, Lee is forced to make guesses as to the strength and location of his adversary. In addition, Lee's victory at Gaines Mills in June 1862, set a precedent for the "Gray Fox." At that time Lee was new to command and had lost his only battle as an army commander. Throughout most of the Gaines Mills battle, Lee was losing as well and his military career hung in the balance. He engineered a victory however, by ordering a final frontal assault on the Union lines. At Gettysburg, the stakes are much higher. Lee has promised Jefferson Davis that his Northern invasion will relieve the pressure on Vicksburg. Also, Lee knows that his army loses strength even as it continues to win battles. This is a recipe that cannot continue. With all this riding in the balance, Lee again opts for a final frontal assault to settle the contest. The Union army has rarely been able to stand up to his own in a concerted battle, and Lee's confidence in his soldiers is boundless. When it fails, Lee finds a distraught General Pickett in tears. He says: "Come, General Pickett. This has been my fight, and upon my shoulders rests the blame....Your men have done all that men can do. The fault is entirely my own." |
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Jul 03 1863 (Friday) GETTYSBURG
DAY THREE
Robert
E. Lee is again up before sunrise in anticipation of an early attack on
Cemetery Ridge by James Longstreet. Orders had gone out to General Ewell
last night, instructing him to open the action on Culp's Hill at dawn;
and to A.P. Hill to detach two brigades to reinforce Ewell's assault. However,
similar orders to James Longstreet don't reach his camp until early in
morning. They are carried by Lieutenant Robert Cartmell, an aide on Lee's
staff. His brother, T.K. Cartmell reports, "[Longstreet] took the
dispatch and wrote these words on the back: 'Too late to execute,' and
handed it back. This was shown Genl. Lee, who, crumpling it in his hand
for a moment, returned the paper to Lt. Cartmell." Lee immediately
sends a message to Ewell, telling him to postpone the attack on Culp's
Hill, but it is too late. Ewell reports "I was ordered to renew
my attack at daylight Friday morning, and as Johnson's position was the
only one affording hopes of doing this to advantage, he was re-enforced
by Smith's brigade, of Early's division, and Daniel's and Rodes' (old)
brigades, of Rodes' division. Just before the time fixed for General Johnson
to advance, the enemy attacked him, to regain the works captured by Steuart
the evening before. They were repulsed..., and he attacked in turn....Half
an hour after Johnson attacked, and when too late to recall him, I received
notice that Longstreet would not attack until 10 o'clock."
HEADQUARTERS
JOHNSON'S DIVISION. - Maj. A. S. PENDLETON, Assistant Adjutant-General.
- MAJOR: Early next morning, the Stonewall Brigade was ordered to the support
of the others....Shortly after, the enemy moved forward to recapture the
line of breastworks which had been taken the night previous, but was repulsed
with great slaughter....Two other assaults were made; both failed....I
am, major, with great respect, your obedient servant, ED. JOHNSON, Major-General.
Intent on retaking the
entrenchments that the Confederates had wrested from the hands of General
Greene in yesterday's battle, Henry Slocum reorganizes his corps (XII)
for a dawn assault. After an hour long bombardment, Slocum's troops are
surprised when the reinforced division of Edward Johnson pre-empts their
attack with an assault of his own. In the dense undergrowth and the rugged
terrain of Culp's Hill, neither side can gain a clear advantage. The commander
of the Stonewall Brigade, General Walker, reports, "I drew my command
back under the hill out of the fire, to give them an opportunity to rest
and clean their guns and fill up their cartridge-boxes. In about an hour,
I was ordered by General Johnson to move more to the right, and renew the
attack, which was done with equally bad success as our former efforts,
and the fire became so destructive that I suffered the brigade to fall
back to a more secure position, as it was a useless sacrifice of life to
keep them longer under so galling a fire." After five hours of
fighting, superior Federal numbers, and the unopposed Federal artillery
take their toll, and Johnson's men are forced to give up their toe hold
on Culp's Hill. Johnson reports, "No further assault was made;
all had been done that it was possible to do."
HDQRS. TWELFTH CORPS,
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. - Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General,
Army of the Potomac. - GENERAL: The First Division was ordered to return
to its position on the right, and General Geary, with the two other brigades
of the Second Division, was ordered back to his original position....The
artillery of the Twelfth Corps...was placed in position during the night
by Lieutenant-Colonel Best, and opened the battle at 4 a.m....The enemy
had been re-enforced during the night, and were fully prepared to resist
our attack....The engagement continued until 10.30 a.m., and resulted in
our regaining possession of our entire line of intrenchments and driving
the enemy back of the position originally held by him....I am, general,
very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. W. SLOCUM, Major-General of
Volunteers, Commanding.
General Lee rides over
to Longstreet's headquarters to discuss the day's plans with "Old
Pete." To Lee's surprise, Longstreet has just finished preparations
for renewing the attack on the right, "with a view to pass around
the hill occupied by the enemy [Little Round Top] on his left."
Lee cancels these plans reiterating, "The enemy is there, and I
am going to strike him." Deferring to Longstreet's opinion that
Hood and McLaw's divisions are needed to protect the army's right flank,
Lee, instead decides to reinforce General Pickett's fresh brigade with
two of A.P. Hill's divisions. In a final effort to dissuade Lee from making
another frontal assault against entrenched enemy forces, Longstreet speaks:
"General, I have been a soldier all my life....It is my opinion
than no 15,000 men every arrayed for battle can take that position."
HDQRS. 1ST ARMY CORPS,
DEPT. OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, Near Culpeper Court-House. - Col. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General. - COLONEL: The commanding general...ordered
a column of attack to be formed of Pickett's, Heth's, and part of Pender's
divisions, the assault to be made directly at the enemy's main position,
the Cemetery Hill. The distance to be passed over under the fire of the
enemy's batteries, and in plain view, seemed too great to insure great
results, particularly as two-thirds of the troops to be engaged in the
assault had been in a severe battle two days previous, Pickett's division
alone being fresh. Orders were given to Major-General Pickett to form his
line under the best cover that he could get from the enemy's batteries,
and so that the center of the assaulting column would arrive at the salient
of the enemy's position, General Pickett's line to be the guide and to
attack the line of the enemy's defenses, and General Pettigrew, in command
of Heth's division, moving on the same line as General Pickett, was to
assault the salient at the same moment. Pickett's division was arranged,
two brigades in the front line, supported by his third brigade, and Wilcox's
brigade was ordered to move in rear of his right flank, to protect it from
any force that the enemy might attempt to move against it. Heth's division,
under the command of Brigadier-General Pettigrew, was arranged in two lines,
and these supported by part of Major-General Pender's division, under Major-General
Trimble. All of the batteries of the First and Third Corps, and some of
those of the Second, were put into the best positions for effective fire
upon the point of attack and the hill occupied by the enemy's left. Colonel
Walton, chief of artillery of First Corps, and Colonel Alexander had posted
our batteries and agreed with the artillery officers of the other corps
upon the signal for the batteries to open....I have the honor to be, colonel,
very respectfully, your most obedient servant, JAMES LONGSTREET, Lieutenant-General,
Commanding.
Colonel Edward Porter
Alexander prepares the artillery for the pre-attack bombardment. He has
eighty guns available from the First Corps, and an additional 60 guns from
A.P. Hill corps. At 1:00 p.m., Alexander gets a message from Longstreet,
"Let the batteries open. Order great care and precision in firing."
Major Dearing reports, "When the signal guns were fired, I
at once brought my battalion in battery to the front, and commenced firing
slowly and deliberately. To insure more accuracy and to guard against the
waste of ammunition, I fired by battery....My fire was directed at the
batteries immediately in my front, and which occupied the heights charged
by Pickett's division. Three caissons were seen by myself to blow up, and
I saw several batteries of the enemy leave the field. At one time...the
batteries of the enemy in our front had nearly all ceased firing; only
a few scattering batteries here and there could be seen to fire. About
this time my ammunition became completely exhausted." The Army
of the Potomac's chief of artillery, Henry Hunt, is inspecting the batteries
on Little Round Top when the cannonade begins. He immediately begins to
organize the Federal response.
ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS,
ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. - Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS, Assistant Adjutant-General,
Army of the Potomac. - GENERAL: I had just finished my inspection..., when
the enemy opened, at about 1 p.m., along his whole right, a furious cannonade
on the left of our line. I estimated the number of his guns bearing on
our west front at from one hundred to one hundred and twenty....To oppose
these we could not, from our restricted position, bring more than eighty
to reply effectively. Our fire was well withheld until the first burst
was over...It was then opened deliberately and with excellent effect. As
soon as the nature of the enemy's attack was made clear..., I went to the
park of the Artillery Reserve, and ordered all the batteries to be ready
to move at a moment's notice....I then proceeded along the line, to observe
the effects of the cannonade and to replace such batteries as should become
disabled. About 2.30 p.m., finding our ammunition running low and that
it was very unsafe to bring up loads of it, a number of caissons and limbers
having been exploded, I directed that the fire should be gradually stopped,
which was done, and the enemy soon slackened his fire also. I then sent
orders for such batteries as were necessary to replace exhausted ones,
and all that were disposable were sent me....Very respectfully, your obedient
servant, HENRY J. HUNT, Brigadier-General and Chief of Artillery, Commanding.
General Gibbon describes
the cannon fire as "the most infernal pandemonium it has ever been
by fortune to look upon." The soldiers manning the front lines
are relieved when it becomes apparent that most of the Rebel shells are
flying over their heads. They call these shots "quartermaster hunters,"
but General Meade finds his headquarters in the line of fire. After his
chief-of-staff Dan Butterfield is nicked by a shell fragment, Meade moves
to the safety of Slocum's headquarters on Powers Hill. Despite this inconvenience,
Meade is remains confident, between the units of Gibbon, Doubleday, and
Hays, he has 26 regiments, or 5,700 soldiers positioned on Cemetery Ridge
to face Lee's attack. Shortly before 3:00 p.m., Colonel Alexander notifies
General Pickett that the time has come to launch the attack. Pickett rides
up to General Longstreet and asks: "General, shall I advance?"
When given a silent, slow, nod, Pickett rides off to begin the attack.
According to Longstreet: "The order for this attack, which I could
not favor under better auspices, would have been revoked had I felt that
I had that privilege."
CAMP NEAR WILLIAMSPORT,
MD. - Maj. C. PICKETT, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Pickett's Division. - MAJOR: At
2.30 p.m., the artillery fire having to some extent abated, the order to
advance was given, first by Major-General Pickett in person, and repeated
by General Garnett with promptness, apparent cheerfulness, and alacrity.
The brigade moved forward at quick time. The ground was open, but little
broken, and from 800 to 1,000 yards from the crest whence we started to
the enemy's line. The brigade moved in good order, keeping up its line
almost perfectly, notwithstanding it had to climb three high post and rail
fences, behind the last of which the enemy's skirmishers were first met
and immediately driven in. Moving on, we soon met the advance line of the
enemy, lying concealed in the grass on the slope, about 100 yards in front
of his second line, which consisted of a stone wall about breast-high,
running nearly parallel to and about 30 paces from the crest of the hill,
which was lined with their artillery. The first line referred to above,
after offering some resistance, was completely routed, and driven in confusion
back to the stone wall. Here we captured some prisoners, which were ordered
to the rear without a guard. Having routed the enemy here, General Garnett
ordered the brigade forward, which it promptly obeyed, loading and firing
as it advanced. Up to this time we had suffered but little from the enemy's....We
were now within about 75 paces of the wall, unsupported on the right and
left, General Kemper being some 50 or 60 yards behind and to the right,
and General Armistead coming up in our rear....Our line, much shattered,
still kept up the advance until within about 20 paces of the wall, when,
for a moment, it recoiled under the terrific fire that poured into our
ranks both from their batteries and from their sheltered infantry. At this
moment, General Kemper came up on the right and General Armistead in rear,
when the three lines, joining in concert, rushed forward with unyielding
determination and an apparent spirit of laudable rivalry to plant the Southern
banner on the walls of the enemy. His strongest and last line was instantly
gained; the Confederate battle-flag waved over his defenses, and the fighting
over the wall became hand to hand, and of the most desperate character;
but more than half having already fallen, our line was found too weak to
rout the enemy....I am, major, with great respect, your obedient servant,
[CHAS. S. PEYTON,] Major, Commanding.
As Pickett's men surge
forward towards the copse of trees, Pettigrew and Trimble's North Carolinians
advance to the angle in the stone wall. General Lane reports, "My
command never moved forward more handsomely. The men reserved their fire,
in accordance with orders, until within good range of the enemy, and then
opened with telling effect..., breaking the line of infantry which was
formed on the crest of the hill. We advanced to within a few yards of the
stone wall, exposed all the while to a heavy raking artillery fire from
the right. My left was here very much exposed, and a column of the enemy's
infantry was thrown forward in that direction, which enfiladed my whole
line." Alexander Webb's brigade struggles to defend the stone
wall. Webb reports, "The Seventy-first Pennsylvania Volunteers
were advanced to the wall on the right of the Sixty-ninth Pennsylvania
Volunteers. Three of Cushing's guns were run down to the fence, carrying
with them their canister...The enemy advanced steadily to the fence, driving
out a portion of the Seventy-first Pennsylvania Volunteers. General Armistead
passed over the fence with probably over 100 of his command and with several
battle-flags....The enemy would probably have succeeded in piercing our
lines had not Colonel Hall advanced with several of his regiments to my
support."
NEAR SANDY HOOK,
MD. - Lieutenant DRIVER, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General. - SIR. The
men were kept lying on their bellies, without firing a shot, until orders
to fire came from Colonel Hall, commanding the brigade, the enemy having
got within 3 or 4 rods of us, when the regiment rose up and delivered two
or three volleys, which broke the rebel regiment opposite us entirely to
pieces, leaving only scattered groups. When the enemy's advance was first
checked by our fire, they tried to return it, but with little effect, hitting
only 4 or 5 men. We were feeling all the enthusiasm of victory, the men
shouting out, "Fredericksburg," imagining the victory as complete
everywhere else as it was in front of the Third Brigade, when Colonel Macy
drew my attention to a spot some rods to the right of us, near a clump
of trees, where the enemy seemed to have broken in. The regiment immediately
got orders to face to the right and to file to the right, with the intention
of forming a line at right angles with the original one; in other words,
changing front to the right. The noise was such, however, that it was impossible
to make any order heard. An order having been given, though it could not
be heard, was naturally interpreted to be an order to retire and form a
new line not outflanked by the enemy. The regiment accordingly retired
some 2 rods, but in the most perfect order. Perceiving, however, that an
example could be seen, though words could not be heard, all the officers
of the regiment rushed to the front, and without further formalities the
regiment was hurried to the important spot. When they arrived there, there
was a very thin line contending with the enemy, who was behind a rail fence,
with the exception of a small number that climbed over, who were speedily
dispatched. The enemy poured in a severe musketry fire, and at the clump
of trees they burst also several shells, so that our loss was very heavy,
more than half the enlisted men of the regiment being killed or disabled,
while there remained but 3 out of 13 officers. Moreover, the contest round
this important spot was very confused, every man fighting on his own hook,
different regiments being mixed together, and half a dozen colors in a
bunch, it being impossible to preserve a regimental line....I have the
honor to be, H. L. ABBOTT, Captain, Comdg. Twentieth Massachusetts Volunteers.
In the midst of the chaos
and confusion, General Winfield Hancock notices that a gap has opened in
the Rebel's attacking formation. He rides over to General Stannard, commander
of the Second Vermont Brigade, and orders him to press forward to exploit
the opening. It is a sweet moment for the Vermonters. As nine-month volunteers,
they have been derided as "nine-monthlings hatched from $200 bounty
eggs," by scornful veterans and, despite having almost finishing
their tour of duty, they have yet to seen any combat. Marching with the
13th Vermont is Captain Stephen Brown. He is under arrest for bringing
water to his men during their killing march to reach Gettysburg. Relieved
of his sword, Brown is leading Company K with a camp hatchet. Wheeling
in the open ground, company by company, they open fire on the Rebel column,
delivering murderous volleys at close range. Abner Doubleday shouts: "Glory
to God! Glory to God! See the Vermonters do it!"
Gettysburg, Pa. -
Lieut. Col. C. KINGSBURY, Jr., Assistant Adjutant-General. - SIR: After
subjecting us for one and one-half hours to the severest cannonade of the
whole battle...The enemy charged with a heavy column of infantry....The
charge was aimed directly upon my command, but...the enemy diverged midway,
and came upon the line on my right. But they did not thus escape the warm
reception prepared for them by the Vermonters....As soon as the change
of the point of attack became evident, I ordered a flank attack upon the
enemy's column. Forming in the open meadow in front of our lines, the Thirteenth
changed front forward on first company; the Sixteenth, after deploying,
performed the same, and formed on the left of the Thirteenth, at right
angles to the main line of our army, bringing them in line of battle upon
the flank of the charging division of the enemy, and opened a destructive
fire at short range, which the enemy sustained but a very few moments before
the larger portion of them surrendered and marched in--not as conquerors,
but as captives. I then ordered the two regiments into their former position.
The order was not filled when I saw another rebel column charging immediately
upon our left. Colonel Veazey, of the Sixteenth, was at once ordered to
attack it in its turn upon the flank. This was done as successfully as
before. The rebel forces, already decimated by the fire of the Fourteenth
Regiment, Colonel Nichols, were scooped almost en masse into our lines.
The Sixteenth took in this charge the regimental colors of the Second Florida
and Eighth Virginia Regiments, and the battle-flag of another regiment....The
movements I have briefly described were executed in the open field, under
a very heavy fire of shell, grape, and musketry, and they were performed
with the promptness and precision of battalion drill. They ended the contest
in the center and substantially closed the battle. Officers and men behaved
like veterans, although it was for most of them their first battle....I
am, with much respect, your obedient servant, GEO. J. STANNARD, Brig. Gen.
of Vols., Comdg. 3d Brig., 3d Div., 1st A. C.
When George Meade opts
not to follow up the Confederate retreat with a counter-charge, the infantry
battle at Gettysburg ends. However, two cavalry officers are determined
to make their mark before the grand battle fades away. Judson Kilpatrick
orders Elon Farnsworth, one of the new "baby brigadiers," to
lead his men against entrenched Rebel infantry near Plum Run. Farnsworth
argues, "The 1st Vermont [Cavalry] has already been fought half
to pieces. These are too good men to kill," but follows his orders.
Kilpatrick reports, "Brigadier-General Farnsworth moved down with
two regiments..., and drove the enemy from one position to another until
a heavy stone wall was reached, behind which the rebel infantry was gathered
in great numbers. Our cavalry broke, rallied, and broke again before that
formidable barrier, but the First Vermont and First West Virginia, led
by the gallant Farnsworth, cleared the fence, sabered the rebels in the
rear, rushed on over a second line of infantry, and were only stopped by
another fence and a third line of infantry and artillery." Four
days after being promoted, Farnsworth is dead. Two miles away, Jeb Stuart
is trying to get the Union cavalry guarding Hanover Road in the open so
he can attack. After several hours of maneuvering, he launches the brigades
of Fitz Lee and Wade Hampton against the bluecoats. Gregg responds by ordering
General Custer to charge the attacking Rebel formation. When the 5,000
cavalrymen collide, the sound is "like the falling of timber."
HDQRS. CAVALRY DIVISION,
ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA. - Col. R. H. CHILTON, Chief of Staff, Army of
Northern Virginia. - GENERAL: The enemy had deployed a heavy line of sharpshooters,
and were advancing toward our position, which was very strong. Our artillery
had, however, left the crest, which it was essential for it to occupy on
account of being of too short range to compete with the longer range guns
of the enemy, but I sent orders for its return....My plan was to employ
the enemy in front with sharpshooters, and move a command of cavalry upon
their left flank from the position lately held by me, but the falling back
of Jenkins' men caused a like movement of those on the left, and the enemy,
sending forward a squadron or two, were about to cut off and capture a
portion of our dismounted sharpshooters. To prevent this, I ordered forward
the nearest cavalry regiment (one of W. H. F. Lee's) quickly to charge
this force of cavalry. It was gallantly done, and about the same time a
portion of General Fitz. Lee's command charged on the left....In these
charges, the impetuosity of those gallant fellows, after two weeks of hard
marching and hard fighting on short rations, was not only extraordinary,
but irresistible. The enemy's masses vanished before them like grain before
the scythe, and that regiment elicited the admiration of every beholder,
and eclipsed the many laurels already won by its gallant veterans. Their
impetuosity carried them too far, and the charge being very much prolonged,
their horses, already jaded by hard marching, failed under it. Their movement
was too rapid to be stopped by couriers, and the enemy perceiving it, were
turning upon them with fresh horses. The First North Carolina Cavalry and
Jeff. Davis Legion were sent to their support, and gradually this hand-to-hand
fighting involved the greater portion of the command till the enemy were
driven from the field, which was now raked by their artillery, posted about
three-quarters of a mile off, our officers and men behaving with the greatest
heroism throughout. Our own artillery commanding the same ground, no more
hand-to-hand fighting occurred, but the wounded were removed and the prisoners
(a large number) taken to the rear....After dark, I directed a withdrawal
to the York road, as our position was so far advanced as to make it hazardous
at night, on account of the proximity of the enemy's infantry....I have
the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant, J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General.
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