MAP ROOM (Gettysburg 06/30/63 Night)
MAP ROOM (Gettysburg 07/01/63)

Jul 02 1863 (Thursday) GETTYSBURG DAY TWO

After a few hours of sleep, R.E. Lee is up before the dawn to reconnoiter the ground where today's attack is to be made. When General McLaws arrives with his division, shortly after 8:00 a.m., Lee explains his plan for a flank march under cover, culminated with a surprise attack up the Emmitsburg Road. Lee tell McLaws that Captain S.R. Johnston, who had earlier led a recon patrol to Little Round Top, will find a route by which his troops could reach their position "without being seen by the enemy." It is not until 2:00 p.m. that Johnston returns and the flank march begins. As Longstreet's men start the six-mile hike, Lee advises General Ewell that his men are to join in the attack as soon as he hears Longstreet's guns and a report circulates among Ewell's commanders that the attack is expected to begin around 4:00 p.m.

HEADQUARTERS KERSHAW'S BRIGADE, Near Chattanooga. - Maj. J. M. GOGGIN, Assistant Adjutant-General. - MAJOR: The command was ordered to move at 4 o'clock on the morning..., but did not leave camp until about sunrise. We reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg, with only a slight detention from trains in the way, and moved to the right of the Third Corps, and were halted until about noon. We were then directed to move under cover of the hills toward the right, with a view to flanking the enemy in that direction, if cover could be found to conceal the movement. Arriving at the hill beyond the hotel, at the stone bridge on the Fairfield road, the column was halted while Generals Longstreet and McLaws reconnoitered the route. After some little delay, the major-general commanding returned, and directed a countermarch, and the command was marched to the left, beyond the point at which we had before halted, and thence, under cover of the woods, to the right of our line of battle. Arriving at the school-house, on the road leading across the Emmitsburg road by the peach orchard...the lieutenant-general commanding directed me to advance my brigade and attack the enemy at that point, turn his flank, and extend along the cross-road, with my left resting toward the Emmitsburg road....I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. B. KERSHAW, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

After surveying his lines, George Meade maps out the positions to be taken by each of his corps. The XII, XI, and I Corps will hold the right on the hills nearest Gettysburg, then Hancock's II Corps will extend the lines along Cemetery Ridge, with Sickles III Corps extending Hancock's line to the Round Tops. Sickles, convinced that his corps would be better served by taking a position near the Peach Orchard along the Emmitsburg Road, sends a detachment of Colonel Berdan's sharpshooters to investigate. General Birney reports, "The force...was driven back by overwhelming numbers....Communicating this important information to Major-General Sickles, I was ordered...to change my front to meet the attack. I did this by advancing my left 500 yards, and swinging by right so as the rest on the Emmitsburg road at the Peach Orchard." Meade learns, at 3:00 p.m., that Sickles Corps is out of position and rides out to investigate. Confederate artillery signals the beginning of the day's attack shortly thereafter, and Meade directs that the V Corps and a division of II Corps be sent to Sickles assistance.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST U.S. SHARPSHOOTERS. - Capt. F. BIRNEY, Assistant Adjutant-General. - CAPTAIN: About 7.30 a.m. I received orders to send forward a detachment of 100 sharpshooters to discover, if possible, what the enemy was doing....As it was impossible with this force to proceed far enough to discover what was being done by the enemy in the rear of this woods, I reported the fact to Major-General Birney, and about 11 a.m. I received an order from him to send out another detachment of 100 sharpshooters farther to the left of our lines, and to take the Third Maine Volunteers as support, with directions to feel the enemy, and to discover their movements, if possible. I moved down the Emmitsburg road some distance beyond our extreme left and deployed the sharpshooters in a line running nearly east and west, and moved forward in a northerly direction parallel with the Emmitsburg road. We soon came upon the enemy, and drove them sufficiently to discover three columns in motion in rear of the woods, changing direction, as it were, by the right flank. We attacked them vigorously on the flank, and from our having come upon them very unexpectedly, and getting close upon them, we were enabled to do great execution, and threw them for a time into confusion. They soon rallied, however, and attacked us, when, having accomplished the object of the reconnaissance, I withdrew under cover of the woods, bringing off most of our wounded, and reported about 2 o'clock to Major-General Birney the result of our operations and discoveries....I have the honor to be, captain, your obedient servant, H. BERDAN, Colonel, Commanding U.S. Sharpshooters.

When Lafayette McLaws reaches his attack position, he is astonished to find "the enemy...massed in my front, and extended to my right and left as far as I could see." Longstreet reacts by positioning Hood's division on McLaws' right, but Hood is also greeted by heavy artillery fire. As Longstreet's attack is beginning, Gouverneur K. Warren, Meade's chief engineer, discovers that Little Round Top is devoid of troops. As the Confederate attackers draw near, Colonel Strong Vincent, the army's youngest brigade commander, rushes his men forward. General Barnes reports, "General Warren...came up, riding rapidly..., and pointing out the position...known as Round Top..., urged the importance of assistance....General Sykes (V Corps commander) yielded to his urgent request, and I immediately directed Colonel Vincent...to proceed to that point with his brigade." Vincent's men reach their objective just minutes before Colonel William Oates' Alabama regiment. Oates reports, "I...continued to press forward, my right passing over the top of the mountain, on the right of the line. On reaching the foot of the mountain below, I found the enemy in heavy force, posted in rear of large rocks upon a slight elevation beyond a depression of some 300 yards in width between the base of the mountain and the open plain beyond....After firing two or three rounds, I discovered that the enemy were giving way in my front. I ordered a charge..., but that portion of his line...held their ground, and continued a most galling fire upon my left."

FIELD NEAR EMMITSBURG. - Lieut. GEORGE B. HERENDEEN, A. A. A. G., Third Brig., First Div., Fifth Army Corps. SIR: We took a farm road crossing Plum Run in order to gain a rugged mountain spur called Granite Spur, or Little Round Top....Passing to the southern slope of Little Round Top, Colonel Vincent indicated to me the ground my regiment was to occupy, informing me that this was the extreme left of our general line, and that a desperate attack was expected in order to turn that position, concluding by telling me I was to" hold that ground at all hazards...." The line faced generally toward a more conspicuous eminence southwest of ours, which is known as Sugar Loaf, or Round Top....My formation was scarcely complete when the artillery was replaced by a vigorous infantry assault upon the center of our brigade to my right....The action was quite sharp and at close quarters.....The close engagement not allowing any change of front, I immediately stretched my regiment to the left, by taking intervals by the left flank, and at the same time "refusing" my left wing, so that it was nearly at right angles with my right....We were not a moment too soon; the enemy's flanking column having gained their desired direction, burst upon my left, where they evidently had expected an unguarded flank, with great demonstration.....They pushed up to within a dozen yards of us before the terrible effectiveness of our fire compelled them to break and take shelter. They renewed the assault on our whole front, and for an hour the fighting was severe. Squads of the enemy broke through our line in several places, and the fight was literally hand to hand. The edge of the fight rolled backward and forward like a wave....It did not seem possible to withstand another shock like....One-half of my left wing had fallen, and a third of my regiment lay just behind us, dead or badly wounded....It was imperative to strike before we were struck by this overwhelming force in a hand-to-hand fight....At that crisis, I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It ran like fire along the line, from man to man, and rose into a shout, with which they sprang forward upon the enemy, now not 30 yards away. The effect was surprising; many of the enemy's first line threw down their arms and surrendered. An officer fired his pistol at my head with one hand, while he handed me his sword with the other. Holding fast by our right, and swinging forward our left, we made an extended "right wheel," before which the enemy's second line broke and fell back, fighting from tree to tree, many being captured, until we had swept the valley and cleared the front of nearly our entire brigade....I succeeded (although with some effort to stop my men, who declared they were "on the road to Richmond") in getting the regiment into good order and resuming our original position....I have the honor to be, your obedient servant, JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN, Colonel, Commanding Twentieth Maine Volunteers.

Lee's instructions call for the attack to be launched in echelon, from right to left, not only by divisions, but also by brigades within the divisions. As a result, as Evander Law's Brigade is struggling for control of Little Round Top, Henry Benning's Brigade is just begining its advance toward Devil's Den. Brigadier-General Ward reports, "The enemy were...coming up in columns en masse, while we had but a single line of battle to receive the shock....My line awaited the clash....The enemy had now approached to within 200 yards of my position, in line and en masse, yelling and shouting. My command did not fire a shot until the enemy came within the distance prescribed, when the whole command fired a volley. This checked the enemy's advance suddenly, which gave our men an opportunity to reload, when another volley was fired into them....While advancing, the rear columns of the enemy pressed forward to the support of the advance, who rallied and again advanced....In this manner for the space of one and a half hours did we advance and retire....The enemy now concentrated his force on our extreme left, with the intention to turn our left flank through a gorge between my left and Sugar Loaf hill."

HEADQUARTERS BENNING'S BRIGADE. - Maj. W. H. SELLERS, Assistant Adjutant-General. - MAJOR: I was informed by Major-General Hood that his division, as the right of Lieutenant-General Longstreet's corps, was about to attack the left of the enemy's line, and that in the attack my brigade would follow Law's brigade at the distance of about 400 yards....I advanced in line of battle....On emerging from the woods, their position became visible. Before us, at the distance of 600 or 800 yards, was an oblong mountain peak, or spur, presenting to us a steep face, much roughened by rocks. To the right, 400 or 500 yards from the peak, was the main mountain itself, with a side that looked almost perpendicular....On the summit of the peak were three pieces of artillery, and a little in advance of them, on a sort of uneven, irregular shelf, were three others....When my line reached the foot of the peak, I found there a part of the First Texas, struggling to make the ascent....The ground was difficult--rocks in many places presenting, by their precipitous sides, insurmountable obstacles, while the fire of the enemy was very heavy and very deadly. The progress was, therefore, not very rapid, but it was regular and uninterrupted. After awhile the enemy were driven from their three front guns. The advance continued, and at length they were driven completely from the peak....The peak being thus taken and the enemy's first line driven behind his second, I made my dispositions to hold the ground gained, which was all that I could do, as I was then much in advance of every other part of our line of battle, and the second line of the enemy on the mountain itself was in a position which seemed to me almost impregnable to any merely front attack even with fresh men....The shells of the enemy from the adjacent mountain were incessantly bursting along the summit of the peak, and every head that showed itself was the target for a Minie ball....I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant, HENRY L. BENNING, Brigadier-General.

An hour after the first of Hood's brigades stepped off, General McLaws sends forward the first of his brigades against the Union position in the peach orchard and wheat field. General Caldwell reports, "The position assigned me was on the right of the Fifth and the left of the Third Corps, and I was ordered to check and drive back the enemy who were advancing at that point....The First, Second, and Third Brigades advanced with the utmost gallantry, driving the enemy before them over difficult and rocky ground, which was desperately contested by the slowly retreating foe....Thus far everything had progressed favorably....General Ayres was moving forward to connect with my left, but I found on going to the right that all the troops on my right had broken and were fleeing to the rear in great confusion. As soon as they broke, and before I could change front, the enemy in great numbers came in upon my right flank and even my rear, compelling me to fall back or have my command taken prisoners." After Caldwell's division retreats from the wheat field, the Confederate tide rolls toward the peach orchard. Hit in the flank by Kershaw's brigade, and in the front by General Barksdale's vicious assault, Charles Graham's brigade is forced steadily back.

HEADQUARTERS KERSHAW'S BRIGADE, Near Chattanooga. - Maj. J. M. GOGGIN, Assistant Adjutant-General. - Maj. J. M. GOGGIN, Assistant Adjutant-General. - MAJOR: I...placed my line in position under cover of the stone wall. Along this wall the division was then formed, Semmes in reserve to me and Barksdale on my left, supported by Wofford, in reserve....I was directed to commence the attack so soon as General Hood became engaged, swinging around toward the peach orchard, and at the same time establishing connection with Hood, on my right, and co-operating with him....Along the front of the orchard, and on the face looking toward the stone house, the enemy's infantry was posted....Under my instructions, I determined to move upon the stony hill, so as to strike it with my center, and thus attack the orchard on its left rear....I moved at once in this direction, gradually changing front to the left. The numerous fences in the way, the stone building and barn, and the morass, and a raking fire of grape and canister, rendered it difficult to retain the line in good order....Barksdale had not yet appeared, but came up soon after, and cleared the orchard....On emerging from the wood, I saw Wofford coming in in splendid style. My left wing had held the enemy in check along their front, and lost no ground. The enemy gave way at Wofford's advance, and, with him, the whole of my left wing advanced to the charge, sweeping the enemy before them, without a moment's stand, across the stone wall, beyond the wheat-field, up to the foot of the mountain....I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant, J. B. KERSHAW, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

After Barksdale's advance, the brigades of Richard Anderson's Division of A.P. Hill's Corps join the attack. General Hancock sees that General Wilcox's advance is coming perilously close to breaking his lines. As a last resort, he sends Colonel William Covill's 1st Minnesota Regiment against the advancing Confederates. Covill manages to stall the advance for ten minutes before being overwhelmed. This gives Hancock enough time to rush in further reinforcements and seal the breach in the line. In the attack, Covill and most of his officers are killed, and only 47 survivors are able to return to Cemetery Ridge uninjured.

HEADQUARTERS WILCOX'S BRIGADE, Bunker Hill, Va. - Maj. THOMAS S. MILLS, Assistant Adjutant-General. - SIR: My instructions were to advance when the troops on my right should advance....This forward movement was made in an open field, the ground rising slightly to the Emmitsburg turnpike....The fence being crossed, my men advanced to the road, in which infantry in line of battle were formed. A brisk musketry fight for a few minutes followed, when the enemy gave way....When my command crossed the pike and began to descend the slope, they were exposed to an artillery fire from numerous pieces, both from the front and from either flank. Before reaching the ravine at the foot of the slope, two lines of infantry were met and broken, and driven pell-mell across the ravine....This stronghold of the enemy, together with his batteries, were almost won, when still another line of infantry descended the slope in our front at a double-quick, to the support of their fleeing comrades and for the defense of the batteries. Seeing this contest so unequal, I dispatched my adjutant-general to the division commander, to ask that support be sent to my men, but no support came. Three...times did this last of the enemy's lines attempt to drive my men back, and were as often repulsed. This struggle at the foot of the hill on which were the enemy's batteries, though so unequal, was continued for some thirty minutes....Without support on either my right or left, my men were withdrawn, to prevent their entire destruction or capture. The enemy did not pursue, but my men retired under a heavy artillery fire, and returned to their original position in line....I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant, C. M. WILCOX, Brigadier-General, Commanding, &c.

Just as Wilcox's attack is being turned away, "Rans" Wright's Georgians strike 400 yards to the north. They advance up Cemetery Ridge, across the stone wall, and capture two dozen cannons. Wright desperately seeks support so he can maintain and exploit his success, but none is forthcoming. Dorsey Pender, the divisional commander has been wounded and has left the field, and A.P. Hill is unavailable. General Posey, posted on Wright's left, reports, "I took out the Twelfth Regiment, and requested Brigadier-General Mahone, who was on my left..., to send me a regiment to support my left. He being at this time ordered to the right, could not comply....It being then nearly dark, I sent the major-general a message, informing him of my position. He then ordered me to fall back to my original position." Reinforcements rushed from Culp's Hill help General Hancock, once again, stabilize the line and drive the Confederate attackers back. General Gibbon reports, "The enemy made a most furious assault with infantry and artillery....Although dispositions were made to check the advance of the enemy, he came on so rapidly as to drive everything before him. I directed solid shot to be thrown from our batteries over the heads of our own men....The smoke was at this time so dense that but little could be seen of the battle, and I directed some of the guns to cease firing, fearing they might injure our own men....The enemy came on with such impetuosity that the head of his column came quite through a vacancy in our line to the left of my division.....By the steadiness, however, of the troops in the immediate vicinity, and the timely arrival of the Twelfth Corps, this advance was checked and driven back with considerable loss, the pursuit being continued for some distance beyond our lines, and all the guns overrun by the enemy retaken. Darkness ended the contest."

HEADQUARTERS WRIGHT'S BRIGADE. - Maj. THOMAS S. MILLS, Assistant Adjutant-General, Anderson's Division. - MAJOR: My men moved steadily forward until reaching within musket range of the Emmitsburg turnpike, when we encountered a strong body of infantry posted under cover of a fence near to and parallel with the road....I had observed that Posey's brigade, on my left, had not advanced, and fearing that, if I proceeded much farther with my left flank entirely unprotected, I might become involved in serious difficulties, I dispatched my aide-de-camp..., with a message to Major-General Anderson, informing him...that General Posey had not advanced with his brigade on my left. To this message I received a reply to press on; that Posey had been ordered in on my left....I immediately charged upon the enemy's line, and drove him in great confusion upon his second line, which was formed behind a stone fence, some 100 or more yards in rear of the Emmitsburg turnpike....Having gained the Emmitsburg turnpike, we again charged upon the enemy, heavily posted behind a stone fence which ran along the abrupt slope of the heights some 150 yards in rear of the pike. Here the enemy made considerable resistance to our farther progress, but was finally forced to retire by the impetuous charge of my command. We were now within less than 100 yards of the crest of the heights, which were lined with artillery, supported by a strong body of infantry, under protection of a stone fence. My men, by a well-directed fire, soon drove the cannoneers from their guns, and, leaping over the fence, charged up to the top of the crest, and drove the enemy's infantry into a rocky gorge...some 80 or 100 yards in rear of the enemy's batteries. We were now complete masters of the field, having gained the key...of the enemy's whole line. Unfortunately...it was discovered that the brigade on our right...was rapidly falling back to the rear, while on our left we were entirely unprotected, the brigade ordered to our support having failed to advance....We were now in a critical condition. The enemy's converging line was rapidly closing upon our rear; a few moments more, and we would be completely surrounded....With painful hearts we abandoned our captured guns, faced about, and prepared to cut our way through the closing lines in our rear. This was effected in tolerable order, but with immense loss. The enemy rushed to his abandoned guns as soon as we began to retire, and poured a severe fire of grape and canister into our thinned ranks as we retired slowly down the slope into the valley below....I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, A. R. WRIGHT, Brigadier-General, Commanding Brigade.

As soon as he hears the sound of Longstreet's guns, at approximately 4:00 p.m., Richard Ewell begins bombarding the Union position on Culp's Hill from nearby Benner's Hill. After a two hour contest, the superior Union firepower on Cemetery and Culp's Hill force the Rebel batteries to retire. Despite this, Ewell issues the order for his men to attack. It takes another hour for Edward Johnson's men to cross the chest high Rock Creek and advance into position. During this time, General Geary's Division has been working furiously to fortify their position. Colonel Godard reports, "The men of the regiment worked with a will...completing the intrenchments, which commanded on the left and center of the regiment the brow of a precipitous hill....This line of intrenchments was about 1 mile from the enemy's front....The line of the regiment was quiet until about 7 p.m., when the enemy's infantry advanced in force." The crisis occurring on Cemetery Hill causes most of Slocum's Corps to be shifted to that position, leaving only the five regiments from upstate New York, of George Greene's brigade, to defend the trenches. General Steuart reports, "The slope of the hill...where the brigade crossed the creek commences about 50 feet from the bank, and, being thickly wooded, the charge of our right wing was made under great disadvantages....The left of the brigade now rested very near one line of the enemy's breastworks, which extended up the hill at right angles to the creek and then parallel with it on the summit. The enemy's attention being called more especially to our right, this fortification was not occupied in force. The Twenty-third Virginia accordingly..., immediately charged the work, and scattered the enemy which was behind it." The furious fighting lasts for two hours, until total darkness forces the combatants to cease firing.

HDQRS. THIRD BRIG., SECOND DIV., TWELFTH CORPS, Camp near Fair Play, Md. - Capt. THOMAS H. ELLIOTT, Asst. Adjt. Gen., Second Division, Twelfth Army Corps. - CAPTAIN: We were attacked on the whole of our front by a large force a few minutes before 7 p.m. The enemy made four distinct charges between 7 and 9.30 p.m., which were effectually resisted. About 8 p.m. the enemy appeared on our right flank, in the intrenchments from which Williams' division had been withdrawn, and attacked the right flank of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Regiment New York Volunteers. Colonel Ireland withdrew his right, throwing back his line perpendicular to the intrenchments in which he had been in position, and presenting his front to the enemy in their new position....I sent to General Wadsworth..., and to General Howard...for assistance, to which they promptly responded....At the close of this night attack, we occupied all the trenches of the Third Brigade. Colonel Ireland had withdrawn his regiment from Kane's trenches, and formed a line with his left in our intrenchments, and in continuation of our line toward a stone wall, which was parallel to Kane's line and about 200 yards in its rear, behind which we found the enemy posted....Very respectfully, your obedient servant, GEO. S. GREENE, Brig. Gen., Comdg. Third Brig., Second Div., Twelfth Corps.

While the struggle for Culp's Hill is still escalating, Jubal Early sends his division against the Union defenses on Cemetery Hill. The attack is successful, and Early's men eagerly rush forward to capture the numerous Union cannons posted on the hill. Once again, General Hancock sends reinforcements to a breach in the line, this time Samuel Carroll's Brigade, and once again the line is secured. General Ewell is unable to send additional units to Early's aid and the Confederate attack fizzles and dies.

HDQRS. SECOND CORPS, ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA, -------- ---, 1863. - Col. R. H. CHILTON, Assistant Adjutant and Inspector General. - COLONEL: As soon as information reached him that Johnson's attack had commenced, General Early, who held the center of my corps, moved Hays' and Hoke's brigades forward against the Cemetery Hill. Charging over a hill into a ravine, they broke a line of the enemy's infantry posted behind a stone wall, and advanced up the steep face of all other hill, over two lines of breastworks. These brigades captured several batteries of artillery and held them until, finding that no attack was made on the right, and that heavy masses of the enemy were advancing against their front and flank, they reluctantly fell back....Major-General Rodes did not advance....Before beginning my advance, I had sent a staff officer to the division of the Third Corps, on my right..., to find out what they were to do. He reported the division under command of General Lane, who succeeded Pender...sent word back that the only orders he had received...were that he was to attack if a favorable opportunity presented. I then wrote to him (it being too late to communicate with the corps commander) that I was about attacking with my corps, and requested that he would co-operate. To this I received no answer, nor do I believe that any advance was made. The want of co-operation on the right made it more difficult for Rodes' division to attack, though, had it been otherwise, I have every reason to believe, from the eminent success attending the assault of Hays and Avery, that the enemy's lines would have been carried....I have the honor to remain, &c., R. S. EWELL, Lieutenant-General, Provisional Army, C. S. Army.
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